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The	 oil	 palm	 industry	 in	 Indonesia,	which	has	undergone	dramatic	
growth	 since	 the	 1980s,	 has	 brought	 serious	 social	 unrest	 to	 local	




acquire	 such	 large	parcels	 of	 land,	 the	oil	palm	 industry	has	utilized	
local	community	 leaders,	 sometimes	as	agents,	 sometimes	as	recipients	
of	bribes.	Ordinary	 local	 residents	have	 rarely	been	 involved	 in	 the	
first	stage	of	development,	and	their	right	to	the	communal	land,	where	
such	oil	palm	plantations	were	being	developed,	has	been	denied.	These	
conditions	have	 led	many	people	to	perceive	 inequities	 in	the	situation,	
and,	 especially	after	Suharto’s	 resignation	 in	1998,	 they	have	claimed	
their	 rights	 to	 the	 land	 and	demanded	more	 equitable	 distribution	
of	benefits.	However,	 they	have	often	been	 subject	 to	violence	 from	
military	personnel	recruited	by	oil	palm	companies	to	work	as	security	
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DPRD	(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah,	Regional	Assembly)	
FFB	(Fresh	fruit	bunches)	












































Indonesian	government’s	 forecast	 for	2009	production	 is	slightly	below	
the	producers’	forecast	of	20	million	tons.1	
	 Barlow	et	al.	 concluded	that	 the	growth	of	 the	oil	palm	 industry	
slowed	amidst	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	democratic	 reforms	of	 the	 late	






	 According	 to	 analysis	 by	 Profundo,	 an	 NGO	 based	 in	 the	









all	 oil	palm	operations	are	profitable	again	 (ibid:	 25-27).	 	According	 to	





lag	 time	period	between	the	 initial	planting	of	 the	palms	and	the	 first	
harvest	of	fruit.
	 As	the	rapid	expansion	of	 the	oil	palm	 industry	after	2002	would	
tend	to	exacerbate	the	problems	of	land	disputes	and	decreasing	security	
that	were	mentioned	 in	 the	work	of	Barlow	et	al.,	we	need	to	analyze	
these	problems	 in	detail	as	well	as	the	 impact	of	Reformasi	 (reform)	at	
the	regional	level	after	Suharto’s	resignation	in	1998.
1 Oil Palm Development and Land Disputes 
1-1 Land Disputes and Security 
	 Barlow	et	 al.	 commented	 on	 security	 concerns	 in	 the	 oil	 palm	
industry	from	1997	to	2002	as	follows	(ibid:14):










	 Robbery	of	plantation	products	has	been	a	great	 concern	 since	




in	the	theft	of	FFB.3	 	 It	 is	not	my	 intention	to	 imply	that	 the	villagers	
whom	I	will	analyze	in	this	essay	are	involved	in	such	activities;	however,	
I	wish	 to	emphasize	 that	security	problems	have	resulted	 in	growing	
tensions	among	the	villagers,	companies,	 local	government	and	military-
police.		
	 Two	Indonesian	NGO	activists4	 identified	 five	reasons,	as	 follows,	
for	the	conflict	between	the	local	people	and	the	plantation	companies	at	
a	workshop	held	in	2007	in	Japan.5	(1)	The	oil	palm	plantation	companies	
would	not	acknowledge	the	people’s	right	 to	 their	communal	 lands.	 (2)	
Development	plans	 for	 oil	 palm	plantations	have	been	 implemented	
without	gaining	the	consensus	of	 local	people.	 (3)	Plantation	companies	
have	manipulated	 and	 sometimes	bribed	 local	 leaders	 to	help	 them	
acquire	 the	 land	 for	plantations;	moreover,	 people	had	no	 chance	 to	
discuss	their	plans	at	the	first	stage	of	development.	 (4)	The	companies	
and	 the	people	have	 a	very	different	notion	 of	 the	meaning	of	 land	
“contracts.”	The	companies	assume	that	they	have	the	right	to	develop	






















Law	in	1967	 (Undang-undang No. 5. 1967)	and	made	 it	possible	 for	the	
government	and	military	to	utilize	the	people’s	communal	 land	without	
compensation.	 	People	had	to	remain	silent	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	violence	
and	terror	of	the	New	Order	period.	 	Furthermore,	a	Regulation	of	the	
Ministry	of	Inner	Affairs	in	1999	(Peraturan Menteri Negara, No. 5, 1999),	
which	basically	admitted	the	people’s	right	to	communal	land,	prescribes	
that	this	right	does	not	 include	HGUs	 (right	of	 land	exploitation)	which	
had	been	designated	prior	 to	 the	 regulation	 (Syahmunir,	 2002:	 21-29).	
Many	people	were	very	disappointed	 in	 this	 regulation,	 because	 it	
made	 it	difficult	 to	make	 legitimate	claims.	 	 In	2005,	 the	government	
released	a	presidential	regulation	 (Perpres	No.	36/2005),	which	allowed	
the	government	to	force	the	release	of	land	when	deemed	in	the	public	









The	expansion	of	 the	oil	palm	 industry	 in	 Indonesia	has	 triggered	a	
number	of	serious	 issues,	 including	deforestation,	 forest	fires	and	social	
conflicts	 (Friends	of	 the	Earth	Netherlands	and	Sawit	Watch	Indonesia,	
2004:	 6-8).	Losing Ground	 (2008)	 reported	details	 of	 violence	 toward	
residents	as	 follows:	 incidents	of	 torture	 (479	residents	and	activists	 in	
41	conflict	incidents),	killings	(12	residents	in	14	incidents),	shootings	(134	
residents	 in	21	cases),	abductions	 (25	residents	 in	7	cases),	arrests	 (936	
residents	in	77	cases),	and	arson	(284	houses	or	huts	in	25	cases).		
	 When	 I	was	 in	West	Sumatra	 in	 2008,	 I	 learned	of	 a	 shooting7	
of	 a	 suspected	FFB	 thief	 in	Kinali,	West	Pasaman.8	 Singgalangg,	 a	
local	newspaper	 in	West	Sumatra,	broke	 the	story	of	 the	shooting	by	















--	and	 there	must	have	been	some	FFB	thefts	occurring	 then	on	 the	




for	 two	weeks,	and	 it	was	reported	 that	his	 left	 leg	might	have	 to	be	
amputated;	the	question	of	who	should	pay	the	hospital	expenditures	was	
still	pending.		
	 The	 regent	 of	West	Pasaman	District	was	 reported	 to	be	very	
angry	about	 the	 incident.	He	expressed	his	regrets	 to	 the	victim,	and	




58 %	of	 its	general	 income,10	 the	regent	and	DPRD	(regional	assembly)	
of	Pasaman	continued	to	support	those	companies	rather	than	confront	
them	over	 incidents	 like	this	 (Afrizal,	2005:	130-31).	 	To	understand	this	




2 Oil Palm Developments in West Pasaman 
According	 to	Tables	 1	 and	 2,	 the	 total	 production	 of	CPO	 in	West	








in	West	 Pasaman	 comprised	 33 %	 of	 the	 total	 in	West	 Sumatra.	
Therefore,	we	can	 say	 that	West	Pasaman	 is	 the	oil	palm	plantation	
belt	of	West	Sumatra.11	 	Tables	3	and	4	 indicate	 the	planted	area	and	





available	 for	oil	palm	plantations	has	nearly	reached	 its	 limit.	The	 land	
used	for	oil	palm	plantations	in	West	Sumatra	is	designated	as	“communal	
land”	(tanah ulayat),12	while	that	of	oil	palm	plantations	in	other	provinces	
consists	of	 state	 land	and	communal	 land.13	 	Communal	 land	has	been	
an	 important	resource	 for	 the	Minangkabau	people,	not	only	 for	 their	
economic	life	but	also	to	buttress	their	identity	as	a	matrilineal	society.			
	 Indonesia’s	vice	president,	Jusuf	Kalla,	alluded	to	the	development	




easier	 in	comparison	 to	 that	 in	other	provinces,	because,	he	said,	 the	
land	of	West	Sumatra	was	still	managed	as	communal	 land,	 so	 it	was	
merely	necessary	to	negotiate	with	village	leaders	to	achieve	permission	




agreement	 in	other	provinces	 in	which	 the	 land	belongs	 to	 individual	
owners.		This	apparent	ignorance	of	the	communal	land	situation	in	West	
Sumatra	threatens	to	trigger	more	land	disputes	in	the	future.		













for	 any	development	plans	must	 be	 obtained	 from	all	 adat	 leaders,	





issue	of	 immigration	 to	Kapar.	 	 It	was	decided	 that	 the	village	adat	






	 In	 the	 late	1980s	a	plan	was	 initiated	to	develop	private	oil	palm	



















the-scenes	 information	about	 the	1997	agreement.	 	They	claimed	 that	
11	leading	figures	of	the	council	received	some	money	from	PHP,	which	
they	retained	 for	 their	own	use	and	never	used	 for	 the	village.24	From	
the	perspective	of	the	Minangkabau	adat	(customary	law),	this	money	is	
siriah-jariah,	or	compensation	 for	communal	 land	exploitation	 (see	note	
18).	As	mentioned	in	3-3,	the	village	leaders	themselves	did	not	intend	to	




would	be	 issued	 the	right	of	 land	exploitation	on	 their	estate.25	 	Even	
though	reception	of	this	money	does	not	constitute	a	contract	to	sell	their	
communal	land,	it	implies	serious	obligations	to	the	company.	
	 Before	PHP	was	officially	permitted	 to	 establish	 the	plantation	
in	1996,	a	 few	officials	of	 the	regional	government	of	Pasaman	District	
were	 said	 by	 local	 villagers	 to	 have	visited	 some	 of	 the	 leaders	 in	
Sasak	who	opposed	the	oil	palm	plantation,	and	to	have	 tried	 to	hand	
them	envelopes.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 the	envelopes	contained	some	money,	




	 KUD Rantau Pasman Sasak,	one	of	the	two	village	unit	cooperatives	
of	 the	oil	palm	 industry	 in	Sasak,	 reported	 in	2005	 that	241	hectares	
had	not	been	planted	yet	from	the	total	area	of	714	hectares	for	plasma	
smallholdings.	The	report	emphasized	the	necessity	of	negotiating	with	
the	 company	 to	 resolve	 the	problem.	The	village	unit	 cooperatives	




















2-2 Differing Definitions of a “Contract” 
Although	acceptance	of	monetary	sums	as	high	as	Rp	700,000,000	 (US $	
300,000)	does	not	mean	that	 the	receivers	have	 finalized	a	contract	 to	
sell	 their	communal	 land	but	merely	 indicates	 that	 they	have	received	
compensation	for	communal	land	exploitation	based	on	the	Minangkabau	
adat,	 it	 is	quite	obvious	 that	 some	ninik-mamak	 (matrilineal	 clan	adat	
leaders)	 and	 the	regional	government	 in	Pasaman	District	authorized	







PHP	as	 improper,	 referring	to	 the	Minangkabau	customary	 law	which	
requires	a	meeting	of	all	village	members	if	the	village	wants	to	pledge	
(not	sell)	their	communal	land.		Only	pawning	(to	a	relative	in	the	same	
village)	 is	permitted;	 “selling”	the	communal	 land	of	a	village	 is	strictly	
prohibited.31	When	vice	president	Jusuf	Kalla	 said	 that	West	Sumatra	














Bureau.	This	allowed	 the	company	 to	exploit	 the	entire	area	of	 2400	
hectares;	at	 the	same	time	 it	meant	 that	 the	status	of	 land	ownership	
remained	uncertain.	








among	 the	adat	 leaders.	 	Mr.	BJL	was	a	ninik-mamak	 from	a	normal	
peasant	family.	He	dominated	KAN	with	his	relationship	to	the	military-
police,	government,	banks	and	business	people.	Later,	 in	 the	1980s,	he	






	 An	 examination	 of	 the	 process	 of	 “selling”	 the	 communal	
land	 reveals	 some	critical	 issues.	 	PHP	promised	 to	designate	50 %	
of	 the	1600-hectare	plantation	as	nucleus	estates	 (PIR)	 and	50 %	as	
smallholdings.35	However,	 1200	 hectares	 of	 the	 1600	 hectares	were	
assigned	 to	nucleus	estates,	 and	only	353	hectares	were	assigned	 to	







	 Even	worse,	 benefits	 from	 the	 estate	 are	 distributed	 to	 local	
residents	 depending	 on	 how	 close	 they	 are	 to	 the	 company.	 	On	
December	 12,	 2005,	 backed	 by	 the	 intermediation	 of	 the	 regional	
government,	a	meeting	was	held	 to	discuss	various	problems	between	
the	customary	 law	 leaders	and	 the	representatives	of	 the	company.37	







the	most	 critical	 farmers’	 association,	 rejected	 receiving	 the	money,	






its	promises.	 	According	 to	 the	agreement	between	 the	company	and	
the	village	unit	cooperative	of	Rantau Pasaman Sasak,	PHP	would	clear	
the	communal	 land	for	cultivation	in	two	areas	of plasma	smallholdings:	
Area	 I,	which	measures	 714	hectares,	 and	Area	 II,	which	 totals	 816	
hectares.	Nevertheless,	 the	village	unit	cooperative	has	harvested	only	
364	hectares	of	Area	I	as	of	December	2006;	there	is	still	no	harvest	from	
109	hectares,	 and	nothing	has	been	planted	yet	 in	 the	remaining	241	
hectares.39
3 Power Relations among Farmers’ Associations in Kapar 
3-1 Split among Farmers’ Associations in Kapar 




one	farmers’	association,	or	Kelompok	Tani	RTTSK	(Rintisan Tani Sakato 
Kapar).	However,	owing	to	the	conflict	over	the	transaction	process	 for	


























Tua Sakoto	members	are	 inclined	to	go	along	with	Sidodali.	 	The	third	
group,	Pemuda Sepakat,	gets	some	credit	from	KKPA,42		in	the	form	of	a	
loan	from	the	department	of	plantation	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	
	 The	 two	 farmers’	 associations,	 RTTSK	 (Rintisan Tani Sakato 
Kapar)	 and	Ladang Basamou,	 can	be	classified	as	moderate	groups.43	




	 The	 last	 farmers’	 group,	Tunas Mekar,	which	means	 “sprout,”	







in	the	fields,	 they	often	 faced	violence	 from	the	 local	police	and	mobile	
brigades	and	 their	crops	were	occasionally	poisoned.	Today	 they	are	
prohibited	from	even	going	to	the	fields	by	the	PHP	security	department	
forces.	 	 In	addition,	180	hectares	of	Tunas Mekar’s	holdings	were	“sold	
out”	 in	2008	by	 the	 leading	 figures	of	KAN.44	However	 they	have	not	
yet	received	any	 letters	or	documents	about	 the	sale.45	 	Here	again,	 it	
is	not	clear	what	the	word	“sold	out”	really	means.	 	 If	 this	means	that	
several	 individuals	have	already	paid	compensation	 (siriah-jariah)	 for	
the	180	hectares	to	some	customary	law	leaders,	the	rights	of	the	Tunas 
Mekar	 are	 critically	 threatened.	Recently	 they	have	been	prohibited	
from	cultivating	their	 land,	so	 they	 face	hardships	 in	maintaining	their	
livelihoods.	
		

















the	area.		As	described	in	the	Chronology of the Communal Land Issue of 
Nagari Kapar, Pasaman District	 (not	dated,	see	note	16)	they	“declared”	
war	on	the	people	and	fired	bullets	in	the	air.		Upon	learning	of	the	police	








those	 residents	who	had	been	detained	 in	 jail	were	 freed,	 contingent	
upon	paying	a	fine	of	Rp	500,000	(US $	50)	per	person.48	







of	provoking	the	destruction	of	 the	 jail	 in	Simpang	Empat	on	April	30,	
2000.50	Even	after	 the	arrests	of	 the	Tunas Mekar	members,	 the	police	









	 Indonesia	 is	often	criticized	 for	 its	abuse	of	prisoners.52	Mr.	ZUL’
s	 remarks	on	his	 experience	 in	prison	 suggest	 that	 such	criticism	 is	
warranted.	 Indonesian	prisoners	are	commonly	 subjected	 to	violence	
and	deprived	 of	 human	dignity.	While	 in	 jail,	Mr.	ZUL	was	beaten	
every	day,	and	 the	police	 tried	 to	 force	him	to	admit	 to	participating	
in	the	destructive	activities	at	 the	regional	police	site.	 	He	was	subject	






gangs	 for	Sidodali,	 or	one	of	 the	dominant	 farmers’	 associations.	The	



















KOMNASHAM	to	acknowledge	 the	 following	assertions:	 “(1)	Because	
the	letter	from	KOMNASHAM	was	not	based	on	hearings	in	our	village,	
writing	such	a	 letter	with	no	proof	 is	a	violation	of	the	existing	law.	 (2)	
As	 the	chairman	of	KAN,	 former	village	mayor	and	ninik-mamak,	we	
cannot	 accept	 the	 criticism	 that	we	 sold	3500	hectares	of	 communal	
land	without	 following	 legal	procedures.	 (3)	As	 the	 transaction	of	 the	






































the	status	of	 the	1600	hectares	 for	which	an	HGU	has	been	 issued	 to	
PHP.	After	a	long	silence,	the	pucuk-adat,	or	a	descendent	of	the	village	







	 Following	 colonial	 law,	 the	 length	 of	 Erpacht	 (right	 of	 land	
exploitation)	was	formerly	35	years,	and	it	could	be	extended	to	75	years.	
However,	 in	2004	Law	No.	18	covering	plantations	made	 it	possible	 to	
extend	 the	 length	of	an	HGU	up	 to	95	years	 (Article	11),	 and	 in	2007	
Investment	Law	No.	25	made	 it	possible	 to	extend	an	HGU	a	 total	of	
up	to	155	years.		As	almost	nobody	knows	the	terms	in	years	for	every	
HGU,	it	is	likely	that	land	disputes	will	increase	in	number	in	the	future.61	
	 Although	 relations	 between	 the	 dominant	 farmers’	 group	
and	 Tunas Mekar	 are	 strained,	 there	 remain	 some	 channels	 for	
communication	and	thus	prospects	 for	 later	reconciliation.	 	 It	was	Mr.	
ZUL,	 an	active	member	of	Tunas Mekar,	who	 introduced	me	 to	Mr.	




BJL	 later	 took	Mr.	ZUL	and	me	to	the	meeting	mentioned	 just	before.	
As	all	 those	present	knew	that	Mr.	ZUL	had	been	arrested	twice	and	
was	 formerly	very	 critical	 of	 them,	 they	were	 embarrassed	by	 our	
unexpected	appearance.	 	Sensing	 that	 the	atmosphere	of	 the	meeting	
would	be	extremely	strained,	the	former	adat	chairman	first	introduced	
us	to	the	other	members.		We	left	the	meeting	before	they	started	their	
discussions,	but	we	were	 later	 informed	 that	 they	vowed	 to	continue	







4. The Social Background of Violence  




at	 the	suspect	without	warning.	Judging	 from	the	situation,	 there	was	
no	evidence	 to	prove	he	had	committed	a	crime.	This	 incident	 raises	
the	question	of	why	mobile	brigades	were	employed	by	 the	oil	palm	
company.	 	While	FFB	theft	 frequently	occurs,	 this	does	not	necessarily	
justify	 the	presence	of	mobile	brigades	 in	 the	estate.	 	 If	 the	company	
wants	to	prevent	theft,	there	is	no	need	to	hire	mobile	brigades	because	
they	are	too	heavily	armed	for	such	a	purpose.	






(New	Order),	 the	 sky	was	 the	 limit	 for	TNI	officers.	 	Superrich	
generals	were	part	 of	 the	 Jakarta	 jet	 set.	 	The	practice	 of	 so-









meager	 income	 by	moonlighting	 as	 security	 guards	 or	 shop	
detectives,	top	generals	became	the	errand	boys	of	big	business.		
	 Basically,	 I	agree	with	the	analysis	of	Liem	Soei	Liong.63	 It	 is	still	
true	 in	 the	 current	Reformasi	 (Reform)	period	 that	 the	military	and	
civil	servants	scout	eagerly	 for	opportunities	 to	make	up	 for	shortages	
of	 income.	 	As	 I	mentioned	 in	note	60,	 the	 regional	government	and	
military	had	been	running	plantations	 (one	a	rubber	plantation	and	the	







forces	 to	guard	 the	 ranch,	 including	completely	destroying	 the	crops	




	 Furthermore,	 to	better	understand	about	 relations	between	 the	
military	and	business,	 it	 is	 important	 to	explore	the	economic	situation	
of	villages	after	regional	autonomy	was	enacted	by	the	Law	No.	22	of	
1999.	 	 In	West	Sumatra,	 the	nagari,	or	a	Minangkabau	village	based	on	
matrilineal	clans,	which	was	separated	 into	several	administrative	desa	
(Javanese	villages)	after	the	village	law	was	passed	in	1979,	was	recreated	





unit	 of	 administration	 relies	upon	donations	 from	 the	 enterprises	 in	
the	village,	 the	more	they	are	 inclined	to	tolerate	the	presence	of	such	
companies.	 	However	the	HGU	would	be	taken	from	companies	 if	 they	




government.	 	Without	 those	enterprises,	a	village	economy	would	 face	
severe	difficulties.	
	 In	 addition,	 it	must	be	 stressed	 that	 the	 revival	 of	 nagari,	 the	




importance,	 which	 fuels	 political	 activity	 related	 to	 these	
administrative	and	political	changes.	The	discussions	about	going	
back	 to	 the	 nagari	 are	 presented	 and	understood	 as	 giving	 a	
greater	 role	 to	 adat	 and	 the	Village	Adat	Council,	 even	 though	
the	new	regulations	may	not	necessarily	give	more	powers	to	the	
council.	A	return	 to	 the	nagari	 structure	 is	 thus	a	 symbolic	act	
within	the	wider	national	political	debate.		At	local	levels,	the	nagari	
government	and	the	stress	on	adat	values	are	intended	to	eradicate	








	 They	are	right	to	point	out	the	 increase	 in	respect	of	adat	values	
and	 the	 authority	 of	 village	 adat	 councils	 after	 the	 nagari	 revival.	
However,	 the	 village	 leaders	 in	Mungo,64	 Guguk	 and	Kapar	 have	







the	communal	 land	disputes	 in	 their	analysis	of	communal	property	of	
Minangkabau	 (Von	Benda-Beckmann,	2006:212-3).	 	They	say	as	 follows;	
“Treating	 ‘communal	 rights’	 as	 a	more	or	 less	homogenous	category	
and	theorizing	about	how	people	are	likely	to	deal	with	property	under	






	 However,	 such	a	conclusion	 lacks	an	understanding	of	 the	power	
balance	 in	 the	village	and	 its	effect	on	decision-making.	Every	village	
mayor	 (wali nagari)	 I	 saw	stressed	 that	he	 tried	 to	 remain	a	neutral	
party	 in	disputes.	 	He	 is	elected	 in	a	village	election,	and	unlike	village	
heads	 in	 the	Suharto	era,	he	 is	not	 required	 to	profess	 fealty	 to	 the	
central	government.	Every	village	has	some	representatives	 from	the	




far	as	 I	know,	virtually	none	of	 these	 Islamic	 leaders	protest	decisions	








4-2 Costs of Security 
At	the	beginning	of	1-1,	I	cited	Barlow	et	al.	 (2003)	on	the	security	cost	
of	oil	palm	plantations.	They	estimated	that	5 % -10 %	of	estates’	crops	
had	been	 stolen,	 and	 that	 oil	 palm	companies	 should	 expect	 to	pay	
approximately	US	5	dollars	per	 ton	of	FFB	 for	 security	 forces.	 	An	
underlying	reason	for	the	thefts	 is	the	fact	that	many	residents	believe	
they	have	 the	right	 to	steal	because	 the	companies	are	not	upholding	
the	 agreed-upon	 ratio	 of	 plasma	 smallholdings	 and	nucleus	 estates.	
Consequently	many	residents,	 including	women	and	children,	 “recover”	














30,000,000	 (US $	 2,300-3,300)	 a	month,	 are	made	 by	 customary	 law	
leaders,	and	the	funds	come	from	PHP,	Bank	Nagari	(the	West	Sumatra	
Development	Bank)	and	the	dominant	 farmers’	associations.	 	They	are	
presumably	paid	additional	 funds	 in	case	of	a	serious	security	 incident.	




	 Besides	 these	 security	people,	 there	are	45	police	 officers	 from	
POLRES	(regional	police	at	the	sub-district	level)	at	PHP.	They	are	also	
charged	with	patrolling	 the	plantation,	 and	 it	 is	usually	 these	police	
officers	who	arrest	 suspicious	people.	 	These	45	POLRES	officers	are	
nominal	members	of	 the	 farmers’	 association	of	Sidodali,	 a	dominant	
farmers’	 association	 in	Kapar,	 and	 they	have	been	bestowed	with	90	
hectares	for	the	miniscule	fee	of	Rp	15	million	(US $	1,600)	per	2-hectare	
kapling.		The	market	price	of	2	hectares	is	approximately	Rp	200	million	




	 The	 adat	 leaders	 of	 the	 dominant	 farmers’	 associations,	who	
received	 large	 monetary	 rewards	 from	 the	 communal	 land	 use,	
reportedly	exhausted	their	proceeds	equally	quickly,	spending	on	liquor,	
















does	not	necessarily	mean	 that	 they	want	 to	be	employed	as	nucleus	
estate	workers	under	the	company	control,	however,	I	assume,	through	





eagerly	 scouting	 for	work.	 	They	are	 expected	 to	willingly	 take	 on	




workers.	 	Many	of	 those	 rubber	plantations	have	now	become	state	









1958	were	 left-leaning.	The	Communist	Party	did	not	 succeed	 in	
capitalizing	 on	 its	 entrenchments	within	 the	 local	military	 and	
administrative	 order,	 in	 large	 part	 because	 it	 had	 become	 so	
firmly	 identified	with	 the	 Javanese	 and	 their	 occupation	 forces.	
In	Payakumbuh,	Pesisir	Selatan	and	parts	 of	Agam,	Communist	
support	derived	 from	 indigenous	 traditions	stretching	back	to	 the	
1920s,	but	 in	Sawahlunto	and	parts	of	Pasaman	 its	major	strength	
lay	among	the	PKI	oriented	Javanese	immigrant	population.	





experience	 in	 the	 field,	 I	am	certain	 that	 the	surrounding	community	















Hilalang.	 	 In	 response,	 they	wanted	 to	 create	 a	new	nagari	 (village)	
of	 their	 own,	but	 their	desire	was	denied	by	 the	 regent.	The	Tarok	
villagers	were	critical	of	plans	to	monopolize	the	communal	land	because	
they	lived	near	the	communal	land,	and	they	worried	that	they	would	be	




mentions	 the	expectation	 that	 the	surrounding	community	will	 assist	
the	security	people,	and	this	can	also	refer	to	the	preman	gangs.		In	fact,	
preman	gangs	have	been	working	as	agents	of	Sidodali,	 the	dominant	
farmers’	 association.	 	This	 law	may	 legalize	 the	presence	of	 preman	
gangs	in	the	name	of	plantation	security.		These	gangs	have	a	powerful	
presence	in	many	areas.		In	Sukabumi,	West	Java,	for	example,	which	is	
a	center	 for	 the	mineral	water	business	 in	 Indonesia,	 the	preman	have	
formed	a	 recruiting	agency,	 and	 they	closely	monitor	 local	 residents’	
activities.70	In	many	places	of	conflict	violence	from	those	preman	gangs	
has	targeted	those	people	who	have	been	fighting	for	their	rights.
5. Concluding Remarks 
















themselves	 in	the	pemuda	 (the	youth)	 idiom,	which	can	be	turned	back	
to	the	Indonesian	Revolution,	and	which	generates	violence	with	an	aura	




other	government	would	 abstain	 from	 the	use	 of	 force.”	 	 It	 is	quite	
certain	 that	preman	gangs	are	employed	by	strongmen,	but	 I	 cannot	
accept	that	preman	gangs	should	be	viewed	as	having	an	aura	of	heroism	









“provocateur.”	 	The	 term	 “provocateur”	 is	 still	 used	 descriptively	
when	people	are	arrested	and	tortured	 for	criticizing	the	dark	side	of	
development	 in	Kapar	and	Mungo.	 “Provocateurs”	was	also	 the	 label	




even	 in	 the	Reform	era.	 	Liem	Soei	Liong	 is	quite	 right	 (Liong,	 2002:	
204)	when	 he	writes	 that	 “Despite	 its	 achievement,	 the	Reformasi 
movement	did	not	 target	 the	 [intelligence]	agencies,	 and	 they	remain	
largely	untouched	by	 reform.”	 In	 conclusion,	 the	more	 support	 the	
Indonesia	government	 lends	to	the	development	policy	of	expanding	oil	






Table 1.  Oil Palm Production in West Sumatra 
Table 2.  Oil Palm Product in West Pasaman
Total production (2004)   252,038 tons 
Developed plantation land    93,602 ha 
Source of Table 1, 2: http://regionalinvestment.com/sipid/id/commodityarea.php?ia=1311&ic=2
Total production (2004)   686,355 tons 
Developed plantation land   280,000 ha 
Projected plantation land      14,500 ha 




Table3. Estimates of Indonesian Consumption
 and  Production of CPO 2000-2005 (in tons) 
No Year Consumption Production 
1 2000 3,575,600 3,733,000 
2 2001 3,944,400 4,161,600 
3 2002 4,355,000 4,633,900 
4 2003 4,844,700 5,164,200 
5 2004 5,461,100 5,759,900 
6 2005 *) 6,043,300 *) 6,429,200 
Table4.  Area of Oil Palm Plantations in Indonesia 
No Year Area (in hectares) % Increase  
1 2000 3,180,614 ha - 
2 2001 3,431,000 ha 7.87% 
3 2002 3,718,541 ha 8.38% 
4 2003 4,045,012 ha 8.77% 
5 2004 *  4,409,306 ha 9% 
* Projection Source of Table 
 3,4: http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/trade/profiles.php?fid=8&db=ind&mode=list&cat=11&pid=6 









3	 Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban Pengurus Bidang Keuangan, Tahun 2005/2006,	










6	 The	 larger	plantation	 companies	usually	 operate	 their	 own	CPO	mills,	while	










10	 The	amount	of	general	 income	of	 the	district,	or	PAD	(Pendapatan Asli Daerah)	
was	Rp	61,800,000,000	(approximately	US $	7,000,000	at	the	then-current	exchange	
rate).	The	exchange	rate	of	rupiah	 to	US	dollars	has	been	stable	at	around	Rp	




Rp15,000	a	 few	 times	during	1998.	The	exchange	rate	of	 rupiah	 to	US	dollars	
before	the	economic	crisis	 in	1997	had	been	between	Rp	1,800	and	Rp	2,300	per	
dollar.		See	the	website	of	Tohoukankoukyoku.		
11	 The	 coastal	 area	 of	 West	 Pasaman	 is	 covered	 with	 peat	 swamps,	 so	 the	
development	of	oil	palm	 in	such	areas	has	raised	environmental	 issues,	 too.	The	
villagers	along	 the	 Indian	Ocean	have	complained	 that	 they	often	experience	




12	 Minangkabau	have	 two	kinds	of	property	designations.	One	 is	harta pusako,	or	
inherited	property	 through	matrilineal	 lineages,	 comprising	both	material	 and	




14	 “Tanah Ulayat Permudah Pembangunan Infrastruktur,”	http://www.kapanlagi.
com/h/0000232331.html.		
15	 See	village	administration	statistics	below	 (Profil Nagari Sasak Tahun 2007,	and	
Profil Nagari Kapa Kecamatan Pasaman Tahun 2002).	 	The	village	mayor	of	
Kapar	told	me	in	February	2006	that	Kapar	had	two	sources	of	income:	one	is	the	
subsidies	distributed	by	 the	government	according	 to	 the	 local	population	and	
area,	which	amounted	to	Rp	77,400,000	 (approximately	US $	8,600)	 in	2006,	and	
the	other	 is	special	 income	from	administrative	fees	and	“donations”	from	village	
enterprises,	which	amounted	to	Rp	29,000,000	(US $	3,000).		
16	 Kronologis Kasus Tanah Ulayat Nagari Kapar (Kapa) Kec. Pasaman Kab. 
Pasaman,	LBH	Padang,	not	dated.	A	pucuk-adat	 is	a	descendent	of	 the	 family	of	
the	village	founder.	
17	 This	information	is	indicated	in	the	document	listed	in	note	16.	
18	 Surat Pernyataan Tentang Pengunaan Tanah Ulayat Kapar,	August	13,	1990.	The	
content	of	the	letter	is	as	follows:	“the	communal	land	will	be	divided	into	plasma,	





smallholdings	and	nucleus	estates.	 	KAN	guarantees	 that	 the	company	will	be	
issued	the	right	of	 land	exploitation	on	the	communal	 land.”	 	As	 is	shown	 later,	
these	requirements	for	the	oil	palm	plantation	development	were	later	neglected.	




plantation	company	 in	Indonesia	and	Malaysia	 (with	a	total	 land	bank	of	573,405	
hectares),	and	the	largest	trader	and	processor	of	edible	oils	and	oilseeds	and	other	
agricultural	products	in	China	(van	Gelder,	2007).	
20	 Putusan Pengadilan Tinggi Pada tgl 8 Januari 2007/No. 119/Pdt/2006/PT.PDG 
dalam perkara Perdata No. 15/PDT.G/2005/PN-LES,	January	31,	2008.	Plasma	
smallholdings	are	 types	of	 oil	palm	plantations,	 typically	 two	hectares	 in	 size,	




22	 The	transaction	process	was	reported	as	 follows:	 (1)	Before	1990,	Mr.	BJL	 (note:	
initials	will	be	used	instead	of	the	names	of	the	individuals	identified	in	this	case	
study),	 the	 former	chairman	of	 the	village	council,	 and	his	close	Ninik-mamak	
friends	 “sold”	 60	hectares	 to	a	developer	 in	Padang.	 (2)	 In	1991,	 240	hectares	
were	 transferred	 to	Kelompok Tani RTTSK,	a	moderate	 farmers’	 association	
in	Kapar,	 however,	Mr.	BJL	 tried	unsuccessfully	 to	 “sell”	 it	 to	 a	 third	party	
later	on.	 	According	 to	 the	 latest	 information,	 the	240	hectares	became	plasma	










Gadang,	a	neighboring	village	of	Kapar.	 (7)	 In	1997,	12	hectares	were	 “sold”	by	
Mr.	BJL.	(8)	The	remaining	200	hectares	of	communal	land	were	transferred	to	a	
person	in	the	village,	and	then	Mr.	BJL	“sold”	them.	
23	 The	meaning	of	 “sold”	 is	ambiguous	 in	 this	document.	The	persons	who	were	
















asked	GMP	 to	keep	 its	promises	 after	hearing	 from	 incensed	 local	 residents,	
the	company	refused	to	honor	 its	commitment.	See	Singgalang,	August	10,	2006,	
February	21,	2007.	Ministry	of	Agriculture	Regulation	No.	26	(2007)	prescribes	that	
a	plantation	company	should	distribute	a	minimum	of	20 %	of	 its	 land	to	plasma	
smallholders	and	no	more	than	80 %	to	nucleus	estates.	 	This	regulation	does	
not	apply	 to	pledges	made	by	plantation	companies	before	 it	was	enacted,	but	




31	 Nobody	would	 sell	 1600	hectares	outright	at	 the	 ridiculously	 low	price	of	Rp	











36	 On	 the	presence	 of	 the	 immigrants,	 see	 4-3,	 Immigrants	 as	Key	Figures	 in	
Conflicts.	
37	 Kesepakatan Bersama Antara PT Permata Hijau Pasaman Dengan Ninik-mamak 
Kapar,	not	dated.	
38	 The	Nagari	Bank,	which	 is	 formally	called	Bank Pembangunan Sumatra Barat	
(West	Sumatra	Development	Bank),	was	established	in	1962	with	5	million	rupiah,	
but	 it	has	since	become	the	second	 largest	bank	 in	West	Sumatra.	 	Nearly	half	
of	 the	savings	of	West	Sumatra	are	kept	 in	 the	Nagari	Bank,	and	middle	class	









42	 KKPA	 (Kredit	Kepada	Koperasi	 Primer	Untuk	Anggotanya,	Credit	 for	 the	
Members	of	Primary	Cooperatives)	















in	 Indonesia,	on	July	24,	2002	described	 local	residents’	actions	 in	Batu	Sangkar	
of	Tanah	Datar	District	as	Rakyat mengamuk,	or	 “The	Peoples’	Violent	Rage.”	
Kompas	didn’t	explain	the	 incident	 in	detail,	but	 it	blamed	the	people	 for	“losing	
their	 reason.”	See Kronologis Peristiwa “Tanjung Emas Berdarah” Kabupaten 
Tanah Datar、SUMBAR,	LBH	Padang,	not	dated.












about	our	 father’s	condition,	and	they	told	us	not	to	worry.	 	We	had	to	 look	 for	
him	three	days	until	we	found	him	at	the	district	hospital.”	
50	 Surat Perintah Penangkap,	August	9,	 2001,	 signed	by	 the	director	of	POLSEK	
Pasaman.	
51	 See	Note	16.	
52	 The	situation	 in	 Indonesia	 jails	even	after	 the	Reform	era	 is	not	much	different	
from	conditions	under	Suharto’s	New	Order.	See	http://www.hrw.org/reports/
pdfs/i/indonesa/indonesi908.pdf.	







54	 Surat Kerapatan Adat Nagari Kapar (Kan)-Pasaman perhal: Menanggapi Surat 
KOMNASHAM tanggal 21 Juli 2000,	August	19,	2000.	
55	 Komite Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia	(National	Committee	of	Human	Right).	




57	 Surat tentang Tanggapan Atas Laporan Sdr Saper Ke LBH Padang Sehubungan 
Dengan Isi Berita Majalah TEMPO,	August	2,	2000.
58	 See	note	20.
59	 Surat Putusan Perhal: Mencabut Pernyataan Permohonan Kasasi	 tanggal	 16	
Pebruari	 2007,	 Pengadilan	Negari	 Lubuksikaping,	 PU.3-LES/P3/I/10-3-2008,	
January	31,	2008.	
60	 An	 instructive	past	 incident	was	 that	 of	 the	Kapalo-Hilalang	 communal	 land	
struggle.		Their	communal	land	was	used	for	a	rubber	plantation	since	the	1910s.	
After	 Indonesian	 independence	 the	rubber	plantation	was	managed	by	civilian	
managers	and	veterans,	but	the	military	command	of	Padang	arrested	the	leaders	
of	 the	plantation	management	 in	1965	as	suspected	Communists	and	seized	the	
plantation.	 	After	Suharto’s	 fall,	due	 to	a	surge	 in	sentiment	 in	 favor	of	people	
reclaiming	their	communal	land,	the	military	management	of	the	rubber	plantation	


















62	 Ali	 is	a	common	 Indonesian	name,	and	Baba	means	Chinese.	 	The	 Indonesian	
generals	visited	Chinese	companies	once	a	month	or	so	for	monetary	favors,	and	
they	were	often	paid	 large	bribes	 to	ensure	 that	 the	Chinese	business	people	
would	receive	favorable	treatment	from	the	Suharto	Government.	
63	 In	Losing Ground,	 the	authors	pointed	out	 that	 “Conflict	 is	also	 fuelled	by	 the	
police,	military	and	militias’	pursuit	of	their	own	interests.”	(Friends	of	the	Earth,	
Life	Mosaic	and	Sawit	Watch,	2008:	44)





whiskey,	gin	and	vodka,	 is	 strictly	 forbidden	by	 Islamic	 law.	 	However,	 these	
prohibited	spirits	are	easily	obtainable	on	 the	black	market.	 	Gambling	mainly	




both	married	and	single,	are	 involved	 in	prostitution.	 	The	 local	people	say	that	
they	are	mainly	Javanese	and	Batak.	
67	 The	original	Indonesian	is,	“Uang hantu dimakan Setan.”
68	 Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia	 (the	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia’s	
Revolutionary	Government)	
69	 Rights	 to	 the	 communal	 land	 of	Kapalo	Hilalang	 after	 the	 struggle	 remain	
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